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Abstract: 
International climate negotiations are now moving towards country-based action driven by 
national pledges, and comprehensive global emissions trading appears a remote prospect. This 
article examines the impact this could have on emissions and production of carbon intensive 
traded products. It compares estimated production and emissions from iron and steel and 
cement from global analyses with country-based modelling results from the Deep 
Decarbonization Pathways Project. The analysis shows that the aggregation of country-level 
modelling tends to underestimate global emissions from Iron and steel and cement, when these 
products could account for up to a fifth of a +2°C compatible carbon budget to 2050. Second, 
the analysis shows that country-based action benchmarks such as equal per capita emissions 
are not suitable to cover traded emissions intensive materials. For some exporting nations, by 
2050 steel production alone could amount to the total national emissions allowance on an equal 
per capita basis. There is a risk that resource intensive countries opt out of the common per 
capita benchmark, and of inefficient carbon leakage. One solution in the absence of 
comprehensive global emissions trading would be to create a global emissions budget for the 
production of GHG intense products based on best practices.  This would be incorporated in the 
global GHG budget and national GHG per capita budgets. The analysis suggests that a global 
iron and steel allocation would be between 0.4 and 2.0 GtCO2 in 2050. Emissions allocations to 
all other sectors combined would then be about 1.3 to 1.45 tCO2 per capita, compared to 1.5 
tCO2 with steel included in the national average. Finally, the analysis highlights the critical 
importance of global efforts to improve technologies and material efficiency in emissions 
intensive commodities manufacturing and use.  
 
Policy relevance statement: 
This article presents new empirical findings on global iron and steel and cement production in a 
low-carbon world economy, demonstrates the incompatibility of equal national per capita 
emissions allocations with efficient global production of emissions intensive products, and offers 
policy relevant insights and suggestions on how these issues could be resolved in practice, 
given the policy framework likely to emerge under the Paris agreement.    
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The theoretically optimal approach to reconciling the production and consumption of emission 
intensive commodities in different countries is international trading in emissions allowances at a 
common global price. Emissions intensive industries would be located wherever they can 
produce most cheaply after accounting for the cost of emissions, and trade flows in emissions 
intensive goods would be matched by trade in emissions permits (as per Coase, 1960).  
 
In practice, however, there is no imminent prospect of full global emissions trading. A bottom-up 
approach of nationally determined contributions is now the key determinant of international 
climate change negotiations, and prevailing experience is that effective carbon prices vary 
greatly between countries (OECD, 2013). This article examines whether country-based planning 
without global coordination is appropriate for highly emissions intensive traded products. It 
focuses on CO2 emissions from the manufacturing of iron and steel
1 and cement, which are 
likely to be critical in future decarbonisation efforts. 
 
It also considers whether benchmarks typically used to compare country-based action in the 
context of a near complete decarbonisation are suitable to cover the production of carbon 
intensive products. This is illustrated with national per capita emissions benchmarks which were 
used in the DDPP (SDSN, 2014).  
 
It does so by comparing country-based modelling results from the Deep Decarbonization 
Pathways Project (DDPP, 2014; DDPP, 2015) to benchmarks from global models. DDPP is a 
collaborative initiative to understand how the world’s largest emitters can transition to a low-
carbon economy in line with limiting the increase in global mean surface temperature to less 
than two degrees. DDPP modelling results indicate national emissions trajectories in a world 
where countries are aiming for similar domestic per capita carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by 
2050. The benchmarks, however, represent a globally coordinated approach to reducing 
emissions from those sectors. The paper analyses the differences between those two datasets 
and investigates some of the potential implications for global policy and accounting frameworks. 
 
IEA’s 2DS (2015) scenario, consistent with the IPCC RCP 2.6 scenario (2014) indicates 2050 
global emissions of about 14.4 GtCO2 for a 50% chance of keeping global warming below 2 
degrees (IEA, 2015), with a total budget up to 2050 of 1055 Gt CO2. This is equivalent to 1.5 t 
CO2 per year per capita assuming the world’s population will reach 9.5 billion by 2050, in line 
with the medium fertility projection of the UN Population Division (DDPP, 2014). 1.5 t CO2 
emissions per capita in 2050 is used as a benchmark by the DDPP project (DDPP, 2014).  
 
                                               
1
 In this article, ‘iron and steel’ refers to the integrated manufacturing of iron and steel, which produces 
crude steel from iron ore. It corresponds to ISIC 241 in the International Standard Industrial Classification 
of All Economic Activities (UNSD, 2008) 
According to the production and technology assumptions in the IEA’s 2DS scenarios, iron and 
steel and cement will result in cumulative emissions of 201 Gt CO2 between 2011 and 2050 
(IEA, 2014; CDP, WRI & WWF, 2015). This represents 19% of the available CO2e budget 
(IPCC, 2014). As we show in this paper, properly accounting for and managing those emissions 
will be critical to help the world stay within the CO2 budget.  
 
This article uses results from 12 country studies under the DDPP: Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
China, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, Russia and the United 
States. Together, they represented 74% of global steel production (Worldsteel, 2015) and 68% 
of global cement production in 2010 (USGS, 2015).  
 
2. Iron and steel 
 
Production projections 
Estimates of global requirements  
 
Demand for steel is mostly driven by construction of buildings and infrastructure (56% of all 
demand today), followed by production of metal goods and various equipment (Allwood, Cullen, 
& Milford, 2012). As a consequence, demand is particularly high in developing countries during 
periods of infrastructure and equipment investment growth. Economic growth eventually leads 
to a saturation of per capita stock (Hatayama, Daigo, Matsuno, & Adachi, 2010). When looking 
at steel annual demand to 2050, most projections suggest that it will reach between 2,100 Mt 
and 2,800 Mt, corresponding to about 35% to 80% growth from 2012 levels (Akashi, Hanaoka, 
Masui, & Kainuma, 2014; Allwood et al., 2012, Bellevrat & Menanteau, 2008; Han, 2013; IEA, 
2014; Pauliuk, Milford, Müller, D. B., & Allwood, 2013). Hatayama et al. (2010) estimates future 
production to be lower, but the analysis discounts the contribution from recycled scrap, which 
can explain the difference. Figure 1 below summarises the sources considered in this article.  
 
 
Figure 1 - Estimated annual demand for steel in 2050, Mt2 
 
                                               
2
 Two data points for one source represent a range. 
 
Significant literature exists on the opportunity to improve material efficiency, but it seems to be 
seldom accounted for in materials demand projections. For example, IEA (2014) estimates that 
demand for materials will be the same in its 2DS and 6DS scenarios. Most other analyses 
reviewed for this article do not mention material efficiency, or consider it in separate scenarios. 
 
Table 2 summarises the theoretical technical opportunities for material efficiency in the five 
major categories of improvements (Fischedick et al., 2014). In this section, we only consider 
opportunities which reduce the overall demand for materials, and will review opportunities which 
can reduce the share of primary materials in total production in the next section focused on 
emissions intensity of production. Opportunities to substitute steel for other materials, such as 
engineered timber in construction (Lehman, 2013) or aluminium in car manufacturing (Roth, 
Clark, & Kelkar, 2001) could substitute or supplement material efficiency improvements.  
 
Adding up all those opportunities suggests that total steel demand could be reduced by up to 
75%. Opportunities which rely on increasing product lifespan could be having negative impacts 
on other decarbonisation activities, such as improvement in the energy efficiency of the building 
and vehicle stock.  Ignoring those opportunities, the opportunities to reduce steel demand still 
add up to about a 58% reduction potential. This is broadly consistent with estimates by Higashi 
(2012) which found that reductions of about 40 percent could be achieved. Applying 40 to 58 
percent reduction to the demand range established in the previous section, this suggests that 
total steel demand by 2050 could range between 43 percent reduction and 8 percent increase 
on 2012 levels should all opportunities be implemented. 
 
Table 1- Estimated opportunities to reduce materials demand from material efficiency 
 
Results from country-level modelling 
 
In this section, DDPP country modelling results (2015) regarding iron and steel production to 
2050 are compared to two benchmarks to assess how realistically they represent global 
production and emissions requirements from iron and steel production to 2050: IEA (2014, 
2015) estimates which are aligned with most of the literature, and a theoretical low range which 
corresponds to the 40 to 58 percent reduction from the IEA (2014) estimates. 
 
When looking at results by DDPP country, it appears that growth broadly stays within the range 
of the lowest and highest benchmark levels for each country (see Figure 3). Production growth 
in non-OECD countries appears to be further below baseline estimates than in OECD countries, 
which could also be due to higher growth expectations in non-OECD countries not included in 
the DDPP project. China’s DDPP production projections are also at the lower end of the 
literature estimates, which range from 430 Mt to 850 Mt by 2050, or -33% to +33% on 2010 
levels (Chen, 2014; Gambhir, 2013; IEA, 2015; Zhou, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 2 - Steel production growth by country in DDPP modelling, compared with 
demand level estimates, index (2010 = 100) 
 
Emissions intensity projections 
Summary of literature 
 
According to most estimates, the current emissions intensity of the iron and steel making 
process is about 1.8 tCO2/t steel (Allwood et al., 2012; Birat, 2010; Carbon Trust, 2011; IEA, 
2009b, 2014, 2015; WorldSteel Association, 2015c). Based on this estimate, the iron and steel 
sector is estimated to have created about 2.8 Gt of CO2 emissions in 2012, which represents 
8% of CO2 emissions in that year (Oliver, Janssens-Maenhout, Muntean, & Peters, 2013). One 
key parameter that drives emissions intensity of production is the relative share of primary (from 
iron ore) and secondary (from recycled steel crap) production, given that secondary steel 
production is much less emissions intensive than primary production (Morfeldt et al., 2015), for 
reasons explained below.  
 
In primary production there are several possible processes with different energy and emissions 
requirements. The most common route is BF-BOF (blast furnace, basic-oxygen furnace), which 
has largely replaced open hearth furnaces (OHF).  . The key energy input and emissions source 
is the coking coal, used as reductant and fuel; natural gas and oil can also be used (WSA, 
2014b). The main alternative modern method for primary steel production is the DRI-EAF 
(Direct reduced iron electric arc furnace) route. The DRI process uses natural gas (90% 
globally) or coal (10%, mainly in India) for energy and a syngas of hydrogen and carbon 
monoxide as the reductant (IEA 2007).  Natural gas reduces the direct GHG intensity of 
reduction compared to coal.  After reduction, the metallic iron is then melted in an Electric Arc 
Furnace (EAF) (Fischedick et al., 2014).  The remainder of global steel production comes from 
secondary production via EAF. The table below summarises estimates of current average and 
best performance (BP) by route, as well as what best available technologies (BAT) and 
technologies under development could deliver. In the table, casting and rolling was separated 
from steelmaking and should be added to each of the routes’ results to obtain overall energy 
and emissions estimates. 
 
Table 2 – Overview of iron and steel technologies performance per ton crude steel  
 
 
One of the options to reduce emissions is to increase the share of production from scrap. This is 
usually constrained by the volume of steel scrap available compared to the total steel demand 
and the requirements of the end use. EAF steel products depend on the quality of the scrap 
steel fed in and may have residual impurities that make them unsuited for purposes where cold 
rolling and malleability are required (Denis, 2014). Estimates on the share that could be 
achieved by 2050 vary between about 50% and 75% (Allwood et al., 2012; IEA, 2009b; Milford 
et al., 2013; Morfeldt, 2015; Pauliuk et al., 2013). Given that there is a limited amount of scrap 
available, increasing the share of recycled steel beyond 50% would require significant 
improvements in material efficiency so as to reduce the overall demand in final steel (Allwood et 
al., 2012; Milford et al., 2013). 
 
As shown from the table, several technologies are under development (e.g. DRI-EAF using 
hydrogen as a reductant) which could deliver emissions intensities of primary production as low 
as 0.2 tCO2/t steel (Carbon Trust, 2011; Fischedick et al., 2014; Milford, 2013). Combining the 
Direct fuel Electricity Total Direct fuel
Electricity
*
Direct Indirect Total
% Direct 
captured
Total, 
tCO2
BF-BOF
2012 20.2 0.8 21.0 0.099 0.147 2.0 0.1 2.1 0% 2.1
Birat, 2010; Carbon Trust, 2011; 2013; Morfeldt et al., 
2015
BP 14.4 0.6 15.0 0.099 0.147 1.4 0.1 1.5 0% 1.5
Birat, 2010; Carbon Trust, 2011; Fischedick et al., 
2014; Milford et al., 2013; Morfeldt et al., 2015; 
Worrell, Price, Neelis, Galitsky, & Zhou, 2007
BAT 11.5 0.6 12.1 0.099 0.006 1.1 0.0 1.1 0% 1.1
IEA, 2009, 2014; Carbon Trust, 2011; Milford et al., 
2013
New technologies
Bio-coke 11.5 0.6 12.1
0.020-
0.042
0.006 0.2-0.5 0.0 0.2-0.5 0% 0.2-0.5
CSIRO, 2013; Carbon Trust, 2011; Fischedick et al., 
2014; IEA, 2009
CCS 15.0 0.8 15.8 0.099 0.006 1.5 0.0 1.5 90% 0.2 EPA, 2012; Fischedick et al., 2014; IEA, 2009
Electrolysis 0.2
Carbon Trust, 2011; Fischedick et al., 2014; IEA, 2009; 
Milford, 2013
DRI-EAF
2012 15.9 3.8 19.7 0.090 0.147 1.4 0.6 2.0 0% 2.0 Birat, 2010; Oda, Akimoto, Sano, & Homma, 2009; 
BP 12.1 1.9 14.0 0.056 0.147 0.7 0.3 1.0 0% 1.0 Oda et al., 2009; Worrell et al., 2007
BAT 12.1 1.9 14.0 0.056 0.006 0.7 0.0 0.7 0% 0.7 Oda et al., 2009; Morfeldt et al., 2015
New technologies
CCS 15.7 2.5 18.2 0.056 0.006 0.9 0.0 0.9 90% 0.1 EPA, 2012; Fischedick et al., 2014
Hydrogen 12.1 1.9 14.0 0.008 0.006 0.1 0.0 0.1 0% 0.1
Fischedick et al., 2014; IEA, 2014; Kavanagh, 2008; 
Oda et al., 2009
EAF (scrap)
2012 3.2 3.2 0.147 0.0 0.5 0.5 0% 0.5 Birat, 2010; Worrell et al., 2007
BP 1.6 1.6 0.147 0.0 0.2 0.2 0% 0.2 Birat, 2010; Worrell et al., 2007
BAT 1.6 1.6 0.006 0.0 0.0 0.0 0% 0.0 IEA, 2009, 2014; Milford et al., 2013
Casting and rolling
2012 2.2 0.4 2.7 0.056 0.147 0.1 0.1 0.2 0% 0.2 Birat, 2010; Worrell et al., 2007
BP 1.6 0.3 1.9 0.056 0.147 0.1 0.0 0.1 0% 0.1 Birat, 2010; Worrell et al., 2007(8?)
BAT 0.2 0.2 0.056 0.006 0.0 0.0 0.0 0% 0.0 Worrell et al., 2007
Total (excluding BF-OHF)
2012 17.1 2.0 19.1 0.1 0.3 1.6 0.3 1.9 0% 1.9 WSA, 2015a, 2015b
* BAT electricity emissions intensity taken from SDSN & IDDRI, 2014. 2012 average emissions intensity set as global average for this analysis (CCA, 2014).
Technology Comments and sources
No detail provided
Energy use, GJ Emissions intensity, Emissions w CCS, Emissions w/o CCS, tCO2
use of charcoal for coking and CCS could even achieve negative emissions (Carbon Trust, 
2011). There are many challenges, however, to making these technologies commercial at a 
large scale, and some recent research efforts have slowed down due to reduced funding and a 
lack of long-term business case in the current policy context (Neuhoff et. al, 2014; WSA, 
2014a). 
 
Based on these estimates, barring the widespread use of charcoal and CCS, it seems that the 
lowest emissions intensity of steel production which could be achieved by 2050 is about 0.2 
tCO2/t steel to 0.4 tCO2/t steel. Recent modelling exercises result in average emissions 
intensities in 2050 of about 0.7 tCO2/t steel to 0.9 tCO2/t steel (IEA, 2014; Milford et al., 2013). 
This corresponds to the upper end of the range of benchmarks of 0.47 to 0.84 tCO2/t steel 
adopted by the DDPP in line with the IPCC 2 degrees scenarios (DDPP, 2014).  
Results from DDPP country-level modelling 
 
Estimates of the emissions intensity of steel production vary by country, with most countries 
having emissions intensities around the theoretical minimum range and even one below it. Low 
emissions intensity estimates in countries such as Indonesia and Canada reflect local 
circumstances, such as all production already coming from EAF in Indonesia, and a high 
potential for low cost CCS in Canada. Other countries are mostly around the IEA (2014, 2015) 
range.      
 
It is worth noting that most countries modelling results only include energy emissions, and so 
their emissions intensity estimates are likely to be below the estimates provided above. IEA 
(2009b) estimated that industrial processes emissions contributed about 5% of direct emissions 
in 2006, however it appears that different countries split direct emissions differently between 
processes and direct fuel combustion, with the Australian national greenhouse gas inventory for 
example attributing about three quarters of direct emissions from iron and steel production to 
industrial processes (DOE, 2015). 
 
Figure 3 - Comparison of iron and steel emissions intensity in 2050 for various DDPP 
countries to ranges of BACT, tCO2/ton crude steel
3  
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 Note: non-energy emissions and analysis are only included for Australia, Canada, Italy, Mexico 
and Russia.  
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3. Cement 
Production projections 
 
Projections estimate that demand for cement in 2050 is likely to be between about 4.5 and 5.7 
Gt (Akashi et al., 2014; Allwood et al., 2012; IEA, 2014; Müller, N., 2007), corresponding to a 
18% to 50% growth compared to 2012 production levels. We estimated that material efficiency 
improvements could deliver about 40 percent reduction in demand, e.g. by using curved fabric 
moulds which allow a more targeted application of concrete (Orr, Darby, Ibell, Evernden, & 
Otlet, 2011), optimising the amount of cement when mixing concrete, extending construction’s 
lifespan, and increasing the re-use of concrete elements by standardising their shape (Allwood 
et al., 2012; Fischedick et al., 2014).  
 
Cement production has a very low exposure to trade, with only about 3.5% of global production 
estimated to be internationally traded in 2013 (Cemnet, 2015). As a result, it is possible to use 
future demand estimates as a proxy for future production levels. IEA (2009b) provides detailed 
projections for future cement demand per capita. Significant differences between IEA’s 2009 
and 2015 projections can be nearly fully attributed to Chinese demand, which changed from 
about 850 Mt in 2050 in the 2009 projections to 1,750 Mt in the 2015 projections (IEA, 2009b; 
IEA, 2015). As a result, we assume that the demand projections for other countries have mostly 
remained unchanged, and for China we present the most recent projections results (IEA, 2015).  
 
Most DDPP country modelling results for cement production per capita are levels lower than the 
IEA estimates. In the case of Canada for example, production levels are even below the low 
range estimates in the DDPP scenario. This comes from an increase in material efficiency as 
well as trade in response to an increased price of production.  
 
Figure 4 - Cement production by country in DDPP modelling, compared with IEA demand 
level estimates, kg per capita 
 
Emissions intensity projections 
 
Greenhouse gas emissions associated with cement production come from both energy and non-
energy sources. Process emissions, about 50% of total emissions, are created during the 
production of clinker, a key component of cement, in which limestone (CaCO3) is converted to 
lime (CaO) through a calcination reaction (CIF, 2015; Fischedick et al., 2014). The remainder of 
the emissions comes from energy use, with about 40% coming from fuel combustion for thermal 
processes and 10% from electricity consumption primarily used for cement grinding and also 
transport (CIF, 2015; CSI, 2015; Fischedick et al., 2014). 
 
Overall, cement production was estimated to create 2.3 GtCO2 of direct emissions in 2012 (IEA, 
2015). In addition, it consumed about 370 TWh of electricity (IEA, 2015), which is likely to have 
created about 200 MtCO2 of indirect emissions (CCA, 2014), bringing total emissions to about 
2.5 GtCO2. This represents about 7% of CO2 emissions in that year (Oliver et al., 2013). 
Opportunities to reduce cement emissions can be categorised in four main categories: energy 
efficiency, shift to alternative fuels, reduce the clinker/cement ratio, and capture and store CO2 
emissions (Ali, Saidur, & Hossain, 2011; Fischedick et al., 2014; IEA, 2009a). 
 
Table 3 below summarises the key drivers of emissions creation in the production of cement. 
The first column summarises the average performance of cement production in 2012, while the 
middle column represents what could be achieved based on some of IEA’s published 
assumptions (2009a, 2009b, 2014, 2015). This scenario leads to a direct emissions intensity of 
about 0.31 tCO2e/t cement by 2050, between the low and high emissions intensity from IEA’s 
2DS scenario of 0.30 and 0.38tCO2e/t cement respectively (IEA, 2014). The rightmost column 
corresponds to the top end of possible values for the various factors considered based on the 
literature, resulting in emissions intensity of about 0.24 tCO2/t cement.  
 
This range is in line with the benchmarks of 0.24 to 0.39 tCO2/t cement adopted by the DDPP 
project based on IPCC 2 degrees scenarios (DDPP, 2014). This is also in line with modelling 
results for China’s cement production which resulted in emissions intensities of about 0.4 tCO2/t 
cement in best available technology (BAT) scenarios and of about 0.22 tCO2/t cement in 
extreme scenarios (Xu, Fleiter, Fan, & Eichhammer, 2014).  
 
Fischedick et al. (2014) suggest even lower emissions intensities around 0.1 tCO2/t cement 
could be achieved through the use of CCS, bioenergy and low carbon electricity, but more 
research is required. Several companies are looking at developing low or even negative carbon 
cements, or processes that allow direct separation  and capture of CO2 (IEA, 2009b). However, 
progress in these technologies is slow due to cost and reliability challenges (Osowiecki, 2015). 
It could also be possible to increase carbonation –or reabsorption of CO2 by concrete and 
cement via post-use crushing and exposure to atmosphere (PCA, 2015).  
 
  
Table 3 - Summary of options to reduce cement emissions and resulting emissions 
intensity  
 
 
In the figure below, the emissions intensities of cement production from DDPP modelling are 
compared to the range of emissions intensities from the IEA roadmaps (2009a, 2014), and the 
low range value presented in the previous section. 
 
Figure 5 - Comparison of cement emissions intensity in 2050 for various DDPP countries 
to ranges of achievable emissions intensities, tCO2/t cement
2  
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Energy emissions from cement production in most DDPP countries modelling fall well below the 
benchmark range. This is mostly due to very low non-energy emissions. Only four countries 
include non-energy emissions estimates in their analysis; two have non-energy emissions in line 
with the benchmark (Australia, Mexico) while two have near zero non-energy emissions 
(Canada, Russia).This results in average non-energy emissions significantly below the 
benchmark values. These results suggest that further work is needed to standardise accounting 
of emissions from cement production in modelling exercises, and to better understand what best 
practice technologies could be implemented under what policy assumptions.   
 
 
4. Impact on countries’ carbon emissions pathways  
Per capita impact of iron and steel and cement production 
This section discusses the impact that iron and steel and cement production might have on 
national emissions budgets if they were based on per capita allocations. In line with the 
preceding sections, we present here the DDPP country modelling results compared with two 
benchmarks based on the literature, namely the midpoint of the IEA range (2014, 2015), and a 
low benchmark corresponding to the midpoint of the low range for production volumes and 
emissions intensity estimates. For steel, benchmark production volumes were calculated based 
on the DDPP production estimates, scaled by country categories (OECD, China, other-non 
OECD). 
Figure 6 - Iron and steel and cement production emissions in 2050, tCO2 per capita 
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NA NA
In total, residual emissions from iron and steel production and cement production represent on 
average 0.28 tCO2 per capita amongst DDPP countries in current modelling results. If the IEA 
benchmark was used, then those residual emissions would add up to about 0.72 tCO2 per 
capita, over 2.5 times more than current results. Should that benchmark be applied, South 
Korea would be particularly impacted with 1.86tCO2 per capita, followed by Russia, Italy and 
China with around 0.80 tCO2 per capita. The minimum impact on DDPP countries should 
material efficiency improvements and very ambitious technology strategies be implemented 
would be 0.21 tCO2 per capita, about 25% below current results.  
Implications for global accounting and management of emissions  
These results highlight several issues with country-based management of emissions intensive 
products.  
 
Risk of overshooting a global emissions target 
 
Consistently for both materials, country models tend to underestimate future production volumes 
and emissions intensities compared to widely accepted benchmarks, which implies that bottom 
up emissions projections based on individual countries’ modelling may underestimate future 
global emissions.  
 
This is in particular true for countries which did not model non-energy emissions, as CO2-
process emissions from iron and steel and cement production are likely to be material by 2050. 
For cement, unless CCS is employed, process emissions could represent about two third of 
emissions in 2050 (IEA, 2009) equivalent to about 0.12 tCO2/capita in the IEA benchmark 
(2014). 
Inadequacy of equal per capita emissions benchmarks to cover traded emissions 
intensive materials, endangering risks of carbon leakage  
 
The analysis suggests that equal per capita benchmarks are not adequate for emissions 
intensive materials, especially when highly traded like iron and steel. Based on the IEA 
benchmark, iron and steel emissions would represent over a quarter of the 1.5 t CO2 per capita 
benchmark in the DDPP countries, and countries like South Korea which are very large 
exporters of steel could see emissions from steel production exceed their total carbon 
allocation.  
Steel is a highly traded product, with about one third of global emissions associated with steel 
production embodied in international trade (Carbon Trust, 2011). In particular, primary 
production, the most emissions intensive form of production, is highly concentrated with about 
90% of primary production located in DDPP countries in 2013 (WSA, 2015b). Geographic 
reallocation of production, for example more in line with consumption, or towards countries 
which could produce low emissions steel at the lowest cost, could reduce the range of country 
impact as observed in the DDPP modelling results.  A full coverage international emissions 
trading system could for example accomplish this.  
 
The issue is less pronounced for cement where trade is currently limited so that country 
consumption in most cases is very similar to production (Cemnet, 2015). However, it is possible 
that given its high emissions intensity, trade of clinker could increase in the future as transport 
cost reduces compared to carbon or production cost, with cement production staying localised.  
 
Leakage protection mechanisms could be introduced to reduce the risk of carbon leakage, for 
example consumption-based taxes per ton of steel or cement consumed (Neuhoff et al., 2014). 
Other potential impacts include reduced ambition of national reduction targets in steel producing 
countries, which could result in decreased ambition globally. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We have analysed a new set of country-based modelling of deep emissions reductions 
trajectories and compared it with global modelling in the literature. Our goal was to shed light on 
the implications for decarbonisation of GHG intense materials production and the global carbon 
budget if average per capita emissions benchmarks were adopted.  
 
The analysis shows that purely nation-based management of emissions intensive products runs 
the risk of overshooting a global emissions target. According to the IEA benchmark, iron and 
steel and cement could make up a quarter of two-degree compatible global CO2 emissions by 
2050, and for some exporting countries account for the total national equal per capita allocation.  
Second, the analysis shows that equal per capita emissions benchmarks are not suitable to 
cover traded emissions intensive materials. They could induce carbon leakage or result in 
resource intensive countries opting out of the common per capita benchmark, and consequent 
overshooting of global carbon budgets.  
 
Comprehensive international emission trading in the context of national emissions allocations 
that add up to a total budget would solve these issues. However this seems a remote prospect 
in the nationally based pledge-and-review framework that is expected under the Paris climate 
agreement. Instead, the issue of emissions intensity products will likely need to be dealt with 
separately.  
 
An approach which could ensure appropriate allocation of global emissions would be to create a 
global budget for emissions from traded GHG intense materials, based on best practice, with 
the remaining global CO2 emissions budget allocated according to per capita benchmarks.  This 
could prevent inefficient carbon leakage and facilitate alignment between international efforts 
and the allocated budget. While not first-best, such a ‘two budget’ approach could effectively 
address the risk of emissions intensive production blowing out national carbon budgets of 
resource rich countries.    
 
The analysis suggests that a global iron and steel allocation compatible with limiting the 
increase in global mean surface temperature to less than two degrees would be between 0.4 
and 2.0 GtCO2 in 2050.  The higher value, corresponding to the IEA technology roadmaps as 
opposed to the theoretical minimum, would represent 13.5% of the total cumulative CO2 
emissions budget between 2011 and 2050. This corresponding to 0.04 to 0.22 tCO2 per capita 
in 2050 on average, with much higher allocations in some countries. The allocation for all other 
emissions sources would be about 1.3 to 1.45 tCO2 per capita, compared to 1.5 tCO2 per capita 
with steel included at the national level.  
 
A similar approach could be taken for production of clinker. In this case, a budget of about 0.7 to 
1.7 GtCO2 would be allocated to cement production, which would correspond to 0.08 to 0.18 
tCO2 per capita.  
 
Finally, the analysis highlights the critical importance of global efforts to improve technologies 
and material efficiency in emissions intensive commodities manufacturing and use. Based on 
recent analyses, residual emissions from iron and steel and cement could be reduced by up to 
70 percent. Strong international action is needed to incentivise research, development and 
prototyping of low GHG intensity steel and cement technologies as well as improvements in 
material efficiency. 
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